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Abstract 
Al Shabaab is currently one of the most powerful groups operating in contemporary 
Somalia. In control of much of southern Somalia, al Shabaab has sustained an insurgency against 
the internationally supported transitional government and its allies throughout the country and 
beyond since early 2007. In contrast to previous Somali Islamist groups, al Shabaab also actively 
seeks to participate in the wider Islamist movement currently sweeping the Muslim world. As 
such the organisation has engaged a number of foreign elements to assist with its struggle. This 
thesis explores the double-sided impact that these various foreign elements have had and argues 
that they have been a crucial factor in al Shabaab‟s relative success. Ranging from al Qaeda and 
other militant Islamist movements to the foreign contingent that has travelled to Somalia to fight 
for al Shabaab to the multitude of minor actors the organisation engages for mutual benefit, these 
foreign elements have noticeably enhanced al Shabaab‟s tactical and strategic capabilities. There 
have been some serious negative repercussions stemming from this heavy foreign influence, 
alienating sections of Somali society and attracting the hostile attention of the West. However, 
this  thesis  concludes  that  the  benefits  provided  by  al  Shabaab‟s  engagement  with  foreign 
elements  has  notably  outweighed  the  negatives  and  that  the  organisation,  despite  its  recent 
setbacks, will continue to pose a threat at least within the region.  
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Introduction 
The current drought in Somalia, which is the worst in approximately half a century and 
has caused famine in parts of the country, is simply the latest in the long list of troubles that have 
plagued  the  country  (Chothia  2011;  Gentleman  2011).  Since  the  fall  of  Somalia‟s  last 
authoritative government in 1991, the country has become the textbook example of a failed state 
with society effectively disintegrating into a Hobbesian state of nature. Numerous problems, 
ranging  from  the  droughts  and  famines  through  to  the  many  pockets  of  lawlessness  where 
criminals thrive, combine to make the lives of many Somalis „nasty, brutish and short‟. A major 
contributor to this state of affairs is the two decade old political vacuum in which a fluid struggle 
for  power  is  fought  between  the  various  regionally  based  governments,  clan  warlords  and 
Islamic inspired militias. In recent years, the conflict in Somalia has become largely dominated 
by the conflict in southern and central Somalia between Islamist insurgents and the forces allied 
to the internationally supported Transitional Federal Government (TFG). 
Currently, the primary Islamist group operating in Somalia is al Shabaab
1 which controls 
much of southern Somalia, although it is able to make its presence felt throughout the remainder 
of the country and beyond. In essence, al Shabaab is an armed Islamist  movement motivated by 
the militant application of Salafi thought that has swept the Muslim world in the past few 
decades. As such, the organisation‟s primary objectives are to establish an Islamic government 
over Somalia and contribute to the international Islamist movement (Curran 2011, para 6). It is 
this  latter  aspect  that  primarily  distinguishes  al  Shabaab  from  the  previous  Somali  Islamist 
groups  from  which  it  evolved.  Whereas  al  Shabaab‟s  predecessors  had  a  primarily  Somali-
centric vision with only vague notions of contributing to the wider fundamentalist movement, al 
Shabaab has actively affiliated itself with the global jihad led by al Qaeda (Gartenstein-Ross 
2009, 25). One notable consequence of this active association with the wider Islamist movement 
has been the greater presence of foreign elements within al Shabaab. 
In this dissertation, I primarily explore the double-sided impact of foreign elements on al 
Shabaab. As such, I pay specific attention to the impact that foreign elements have had on al 
Shabaab‟s performance and how at the same time it has affected al Shabaab‟s popularity within 
Somalia. Although the engagement with various ideological affiliates accounts for the majority 
of the foreign involvement with al Shabaab, there have also been significant interactions with 
more basely motivated actors. The general impact of these foreign elements has been largely 
beneficial for the organisation, responsible for making al Shabaab a notably more dangerous 
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organisation than its predecessors. While foreign involvement has had some notable negative 
repercussions,  such  as  defections  and  the  alienation  of  aspects  of  Somali  society,  foreign 
elements have been largely responsible for the transfer of tactical and technical expertise that are 
not readily available inside of Somalia. The various foreign elements also known to provide 
many of the resources and new quality recruits necessary for al Shabaab to continue its struggle.  
There is currently a growing body of literature devoted to examining al Shabaab and the 
security situation in Somalia in general. These writings have generally provided several good 
overviews on the group‟s organisation, capacities, ideology and so forth. However, the majority 
of these texts mainly focus on how the world, or more specifically the United States of America 
(USA), should approach Somalia and combat al Shabaab. For example, Ken Menkhaus (2009) 
argues that the USA should avoid overtly intervening for risk of de-legitimising their allies but 
instead should promote greater human rights and accountability to reduce the bad governance 
that is rife within the TFG administration. Bronwyn Bruton (2010) similarly argues for a strategy 
that  she  calls  „constructive  disengagement‟  in  which  the  USA  would  engage  with  regional 
powers  and  „moderates‟  whilst  withdrawing  from  direct  involvement.  In  contrast,  this 
dissertation does not seek to propose any solution to Somalia‟s ills or critique the merits of 
solutions that have been previously suggested. Rather, this work contributes to the smaller body 
of  literature  that  analyses  al  Shabaab  in  itself;  seeking  to  build  on  writings  such  as  the 
comprehensive reports written by Christopher Harnisch (2010) and the analyses of David Shinn 
(2009; 2011).  
To approach al Shabaab in this way, my dissertation is broken into three main parts. The 
first  chapter  is  devoted  to  providing  the  contextual  information  necessary  to  gain  an 
understanding  of  al  Shabaab.  As  such,  the  chapter  will  be  divided  into  two  main  parts;  a 
background to the conflict that gave birth to al Shabaab and an exploration of the organisation‟s 
composition. The first part encompasses the relevant areas of contemporary Somali history as 
well as the actions of al Shabaab to demonstrate how the organisation has come into the position 
it finds itself in today. The second section explores the many sections of al Shabaab‟s anatomy 
from the basic administration and composition of its forces to its leadership and ideology. 
Chapter two identifies the main foreign elements and how they have been engaging with 
al  Shabaab.  Effectively,  I  shall  make  three  distinctions  in  which  to  categorise  the  foreign 
elements: other Islamist groups, the foreign contingent that fights for al Shabaab, and the host of 
minor parties who shall all come under the blanket term „others‟. As the main Islamist group that 
al Shabaab interacts publicly with is al Qaeda, the majority of the first section explores the 
relationship between these two organisations. In the analysis of the foreign contingent, I make 3 
 
the important distinction between those fighters from non-ethnic Somali background and those 
who are from the diaspora as they both contribute in notably different ways. The section on 
„others‟ covers several actors from patrons of al Shabaab to the various criminal organisations 
that assist with weapons and people smuggling.  
The third chapter explores many of the ways in which those foreign elements indentified 
in chapter two have impacted upon al Shabaab behaviour. Again, I break down the impacts into 
three main areas: tactical, strategic and negative. Tactical influences are identified as one of the 
most  noticeable  manifestations  of  the  foreign  influence,  encompassing  the  increased 
sophistication of combat operations and weaponry to the inclusion of foreign methods such as 
roadside  bombs  and  suicide  attacks.  Strategically,  the  foreign  influence  has  been  largely 
responsible  for  providing  al  Shabaab  with  a  coherent  direction  to  plan  towards  as  well  as 
assisting in the cementing of the organisation‟s hold on its territories. Of the negative impacts 
from  the  foreign  influences  the  most  notable  have  been  attracting  the  hostile  attention  of 
international  powers  and the  alienation  of  ordinary  Somalis,  particularly  in  central  Somalia, 
which has led to some notable defections and local uprisings. 
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Chapter 1: On Al Shabaab. 
Despite  suffering  some  recent  setbacks  from  the  current  drought  and  pressure  from 
various  armed  forces,  al  Shabaab  remains  one  of  the  most  powerful  organisations  within 
Somalia, known to operate a more sophisticated and comprehensive administration than any 
other Somali authority (MSGE 2011, 27). As such, before the foreign elements‟ pivotal role 
upon al Shabaab can be properly understood, the organisation in itself needs to be examined in 
some detail. This chapter covers the relevant history of Somalia, tracing al Shabaab‟s history 
from its origins as a breakaway faction of a previous Islamist group through to its establishment 
of  dominance  over  much  of  Southern  Somalia.  Also  explored  is  the  composition  of  the 
organisation, ranging from its administrations to its leadership to its radical ideology that shapes 
much of its actions. 
The Background of the Organisation 
Al Shabaab’s origins: 
Militant Islam in its modern form first appeared in Somalia in response to the authoritarian 
socialist rule of General Mohamed Siad Barre who came to power in 1969 via a coup. Although 
the earliest example of an indigenous Somali Islamist group appears in the 1970s, the most 
prominent movement was al Itihaad al Islamiya (AIAI)
2 which was founded sometime in the 
early 1980s (Harnisch 2010a, 10; S hinn 2011, 204). AIAI‟s ideology combined Islamist and 
nationalist  ideologies,  seeking  to  establish  an  Islamic  state  and  to  unify  Somalia  with  the 
neighbouring ethnically Somali territories, most notably Ethiopia‟s Ogaden region (Gartenstein-
Ross 2009, 26; Stevenson 2007, 43). Although AIAI was not involved when warlords overthrew 
Siad Barre in 1991 and never became a major actor within Somalia, the organisation is believed 
to have been at its most active in the aftermath of the state‟s collapse. Notable AIAI activities 
included governing the Somali town Luuq from 1991 to 1996 and conducting several terrorist 
attacks within Ethiopia in the mid 1990s (Menkhaus 2005, 35; Shinn 2011, 204). After Ethiopia 
attacked Luuq in 1996, forcing AIAI from its only stronghold, the organisation adopted a new 
strategy. Abandoning attempts to hold territory and spreading its ideology via military means, 
AIAI focused on integrating into communities to provide social services, such as education, in 
order to establish an Islamist constituency (Dagne 2010, 23; Menkhaus 2005, 35-36). 
Foreign Islamist activity first became evident in Somalia when al Qaeda initiated contact 
with AIAI in 1992 and dispatched a team of operatives to assist in February 1993 (Shinn 2009, 
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2). Although these operatives managed to establish a few training camps and assisted in battles 
against the international peacekeeping force, it is widely believed that al Qaeda has since over 
exaggerated its role in Somalia (Gartenstein-Ross 2009, 26; Harnisch 2010a, 10-11). Experience 
with clan extortion, bandit attacks and a general apathy towards its cause led al Qaeda to realise 
it had overestimated the costs of operating in Somalia and that the country would prove infertile 
ground for further engagement (Shinn 2011, 205; Stevenson 2007, 42). However, al Qaeda did 
manage to establish some local support, most notably managing to radicalise a number of youths 
(Shinn 2011, 205). Many of these youths went on to train in al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan 
during the late 1990s and participate in several militant Islamist organisations (Shinn 2009, 2).  
Al Shabaab directly descends from both AIAI and these radicalised youths. By the early 
2000s, AIAI had effectively disintegrated into a network of alumni, most of whom were not 
politically active (Menkhaus 2005, 36). In 2003, during an AIAI conference in the Somaliland 
town of Laascanood to decide upon a new political front, a group of young radicals left the 
meeting in disagreement with the elder leadership‟s direction. Within days these youths had 
launched  a  parallel  conference  and  in  which  they  founded  al  Shabaab  as  a  rival  Islamist 
movement (Dagne 2010, 5; Shinn 2011, 206). The principal founding members were the late 
Aden  Hashi  Ayro,  Ahmed  Abdi  Godane
3,  Mukhtar  Ali  Robow
4,  Faud  Mo hamed  Khalaf 
Shangole and Ibrahim Haji Jama al -Afghani; all of whom are believed to have fought in 
Afghanistan under al Qaeda (Dagne 2010, 5; Harnisch 2010a, 20). Although implicated in a 
number of assassinations (Menkhaus 2005, 42; McGregor 2008, 254), it appears that initially al 
Shabaab played no major role until it joined the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) as an elite militia 
some time during 2005.  
The Islamic Courts Union era 
The  ICU  was  formed  around  mid  2004  when  eleven  minor  Islamic  administrations 
ranging from moderate to radical that held jurisdictions in and around Mogadishu joined forces 
to establish a new single administration (Menkhaus 2005, 37; Stevenson 2007, 42). Although 
Somalis generally had a moderate and casual approach to Islam, since 1991 various independent 
sharia courts throughout the country had been established to provide order within the local 
community. These courts gradually became networked and by 2004 there was broad support in 
Mogadishu  from  the  public,  clan  leaders  and  business  community  for  their  merger  into  a 
coalition (Bruton 2010, 7; Harnisch 2010a, 11). Alarmed by the potential of radicals gaining 
control of Somalia through the ICU, USA intelligence agents facilitated the formation of a loose 
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coalition grandiosely named the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism 
(ARPC) despite mainly consisting of local warlords (Bruton 2010, 7; Stevenson 2007, 42). 
The  formation  of  the  ARPC  and  its  overt  US  support  immediately  caused  a  public 
backlash ensuring that many of those that had previously been reluctant joined the ICU. By June 
2006, the expanded ICU had soundly defeated the ARPC, established order over Mogadishu and 
began to provide basic government services (Gartenstein-Ross 2009, 29; Stevenson 2007, 42). 
This success attracted considerable national enthusiasm, which subsequently led to many other 
groups  allying  themselves  with  the  ICU
5,  allowing  for  its  governance  model  to  spread 
throughout southern Somalia (Bruton 2010, 7; Menkhaus 2008, 2). Ironically, the militant wing 
of the ICU, as a major contributor to the ARPC‟s defeat, began to amass greater influence over 
the  organisation‟s  policy. As  such, the  ICU  started to  implement  a  stricter  interpretation  of 
sharia and introduce radical laws such as bans on music and the popular local stimulant qat 
(Bruton 2010, 8; Dagne 2010, 18-19). Radical Islamists also gained several key positions in the 
ICU,  most  notable  being  Hassan  Dahir  Aweys.  Aweys,  formerly  a senior  AIAI  leader  who 
remained affiliated with al Shabaab after its split from AIAI, was appointed chairman of the 
ICU‟s Executive Committee, replacing the moderate Sharif Sheikh Ahmed although the latter 
retained the overall leadership of ICU (Harnisch 2010a, 11; Stevenson 2007, 43).  
The Ethiopian invasion and al Shabaab’s evolution 
By late 2006, the feeble but internationally recognised Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG) was effectively besieged in Baidoa as the ICU expanded across central and southern 
Somalia. After the United Nations (UN) resolution 1725 calling for troops to protect the TFG 
produced a lacklustre response, ICU forces, encouraged by their local success and popularity, 
advanced on Baidoa in December 2006 (Stevenson 2007, 43). However Ethiopia, concerned by 
radicals within the ICU calling for a jihad against it, intervened militarily with US support to 
protect the TFG and oust the ICU (Gartenstein-Ross 2009, 28; Menkhaus 2008, 2). The ICU‟s 
irregular militias proved no match for Ethiopia‟s professional army, backed by its air force, and 
with many ICU fighters quickly killed or routed outside of Baidoa (Bruton 2010, 8; McGregor 
2008, 256). Ethiopian and TFG forces then proceeded to reverse all of ICU‟s recent gains and 
captured  Mogadishu  on  the  28
th  of  December,  2006  (Stevenson  2007,  43;  Gartenstein-Ross 
2009, 28). Despite initially calling for an insurgency, the ICU effectively was forced to disband. 
Much of ICU‟s leadership fled the country while its weapons and militia largely reverted to the 
various clans that had supplied them (McGregor 2008, 253; Menkhaus 2008, 2).   
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However, for clarity, I shall continue to refer to it as the ICU.   7 
 
By  early  2007,  the  remnants  of  the  ICU  had  effectively  fractured  into  three  major 
groups: the moderates, the extremists in exile and those who remained in Somalia to fight the 
insurgency. The moderates entered into peace negotiations and eventually joined the TFG after 
the signing of the Djibouti agreement in August 2008, with Sheikh Ahmed actually becoming 
President in early 2009 (Menkhaus 2009, 2; Shinn 2011, 206). The exiled radicals regrouped in 
Eritrea, launching the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) with other aspects of 
Somali society opposed to the Ethiopian invasion (Harnisch, 2010a, 11). The ARS split in 2008, 
with  many  entering  into the  peace  process  alongside  the  moderates  and  Aweys  leading  the 
Islamists to join with three other militant groups to form Hizbul Islam
6 in early 2009 (Dagne 
2010, 21-22; Le Sage 2010, 2). Those Islamists that remained behind  regrouped in southern 
Somalia and within weeks were fighting in the wider guerrilla insurgency against the Ethiopian 
and TFG forces.  
It appears that al Shabaab was one of the few ICU militia to remain largely intact and, 
having developed a reputation for  being disciplined and ruthless fighters in action against the 
APRC and TFG, quickly assumed a leading role in the insurgency (Harnisch 2010a, 11 -12; 
McGregor  2008,  258).  Initially  al  Shabaab  attracted  much  support  due  to  its  effective 
combination of Somali nationalism and reverence for Islam under the leadership of Ayro, who 
had become a key military commander in the ICU  before its fall (Curran 2011, para 4; Shinn 
2009, 2). Although effectively operating independently by early 2007, al Shabaab only officially 
broke with the remnants of the ICU in September 2007, publicly denouncing them for failing to 
adopt a „global jihadist ideology‟ and making deals with „apostates‟ in attempts to return to 
power (Gartenstein-Ross 2009, 28; Menkhaus 2008, 3). By early 2008, al Shabaab was strong 
enough to actively engage Ethiopian troops beyond guerrilla style hit-and-run attacks, instead 
beginning  to  take  over  locations  throughout  southern  Somalia  and  intensify  its  attacks  on 
Ethiopian and TFG forces within Mogadishu (Curran 2011, para 7; Harnisch 2010a, 12).  
Ayro was killed in May 2008 in a US missile strike on his home in central Somalia and 
was  succeeded  by  his  deputy  Godane,  a  hardliner  who  proceeded  to  adopt  subtle  strategic 
changes that brought al Shabaab closer to the international Islamist movement (Harnisch 2010a, 
12; Shinn 2009, 2). Whilst under Ayro, al Shabaab had previously engaged with global jihadi 
and  adhered to  their  ideology,  under  Godane this  process  intensified.  During  June  2008, al 
Shabaab‟s new leader published his first statement to establish contact with the wider Islamist 
movement. In it, Godane delivered greetings and near sycophantic praise to al Qaeda, whom al 
Shabaab later swore allegiance to, as well as other major Islamist groups such as the Afghanistan 
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Taliban and the Islamic State in Iraq (Gartenstein-Ross 2009, 29-30, Harnisch 2010a, 24-25). Al 
Shabaab has since demonstrated its ability to successfully carry out sophisticated terrorist attacks 
in the name of the global movement throughout Somalia and beyond; the most notable example 
being the twin suicide bombings in the Ugandan capital Kampala that killed 76 and injured 85 
on the 11
th of July, 2010 (Harnisch 2010b, para 1). 
Post-Ethiopian Somalia 
Ethiopia withdrew its troops in January 2009, in accordance with the Djibouti peace 
agreement, initially led to hopes that al Shabaab would fade into irrelevance after losing their 
main adversary and rallying point (Menkhaus 2009, 2). However, al Shabaab proved resilient, 
shifting its rhetoric to a primarily Islamist focus coupled with calls to expel „Western puppets‟, 
namely the TFG and the small African Union peacekeeping force (AMISOM) protecting them 
(Curran 2011, para 5-6). A greater challenge for al Shabaab came from the presence of other 
Islamist groups who resisted al Shabaab‟s authority. The most prominent of these was Aweys‟ 
organisation Hizbul Islam which occasionally cooperated with al Shabaab but also fought battles 
over territory and provided a rival Islamist organisation potentially dividing loyalties (Le Sage 
2010, 2; Roggio 2010). Another notable group is Ahlu-Sunna wal Jama (ASWJ), a formally 
apolitical Sufi religious network that became militarised during 2008, seizing some territory in 
central Somalia and allying itself to the TFG (Hassan 2009, 5).  However, al Shabaab has not yet 
been seriously troubled by ASWJ efforts as the latter‟s loosely associated factions have a limited 
ability to project any power and a heavy reliance on support from Ethiopia has caused many to 
view them as proxies, diminishing local support (Bruton 2009, 87). 
Hizbul Islam eventually was absorbed into al Shabaab after suffering several defeats and 
defections, the most notable being the entire Ras Komboni Brigade, approximately one quarter 
of Hizbul Islam, which defected to al Shabaab in February, 2010 (Dagne 2010, 6; Roggio 2010). 
Though  Aweys  had  been  offering  to  negotiate  a  merger  since  2009,  Godane  rebuffed  him 
arguing that Hizbul Islam was too weak to contribute to al Shabaab‟s struggle (Weinstein 2011, 
para 6). However, dissatisfaction with Godane‟s leadership, stemming from his refusal to accept 
Aweys‟ offers, claims of his resorting to clan politics and the failed August 2010 offensive 
culminated in his removal as „Emir‟ of al Shabaab in December 2010 (Weinstein 2011). Godane 
was replaced by al Afghani, who allowed Hizbul Islam to merge with al Shabaab on the 24 of 
December  2010  (Roggio  2010;  Weinstein  2011).  As  the  situation  stands  today,  al  Shabaab 
remains  the  only  significant  insurgent  group  operating  in  Somalia,  effectively  operating  a 
credible shadow government over much of southern Somalia and, unlike most organisations in 
Somalia, is able to inspire loyalty beyond its immediate area of control (MGSE 2011, 17). 9 
 
The Anatomy of Al Shabaab 
Basic Governance Style 
Although the exact composition of al Shabaab is not known widely outside of the group, 
a  general  structure  of  the  organisation  is  ascertainable.  Basically,  al  Shabaab  operates  as  a 
network of Islamic administrations answerable to a central council which govern the territories 
that comprise of its self declared „Islamic Emirate of Somalia‟, also known as the „Islamic 
Provinces‟ (Harnisch 2010a, 15; Weinstein 2008, para 5). As such, these administrations are 
primarily  responsible  for  implementing  al  Shabaab‟s  ultraconservative  interpretation  of  the 
sharia, although the specific implementation appears to vary slightly depending on the specific 
administration (Gartenstein-Ross 2009, 31-32; Harnisch 2010a, 17). In  general though, laws 
implemented by al Shabaab‟s administrations include requiring women to wear the veil, making 
mandatory the five daily prayers, amputations for theft, banning adultery and prohibiting „un-
Islamic‟ practices such as listening to music, watching Western movies, playing soccer and 
using narcotics (Gartenstein-Ross 2009, 31-32; Harnisch 2010a, 17). These administrations also 
provide other governance services usual of a State, namely collecting taxes and overseeing the 
construction or repair of public facilities such as roads, bridges and canals (Gartenstein-Ross 
2009, 32; Harnisch 2010a, 15-17).  
Al Shabaab establishes and maintains control of the Islamic Provinces via a mixture of 
public relations and intimidation (Bruton 2009, 87; Harnisch 2010a, 14-15). When assuming 
control of territory, al Shabaab conducts choreographed town visits which involve public rallies, 
radio  announcements,  distributing  zakat
7  to  the  poor  and  having  a  ceremony  to  voluntarily 
absorb the local clan leaders into the new administration (Bruton 2010, 11; Harnisch 2010a, 14-
15). This use of propaganda, especially via the radio, tends to continue after the administration is 
established, regularly justifying the organisation‟s actions and vilifying their enemies (Curran 
2011). To ensure that al Shabaab‟s radical version of sharia is followed and any opposition 
crushed, laws are rigorously enforced by al Shabaab‟s religious police, the Army of Hisbul, with 
punishments regularly carried out in public. Punishments include whippings and amputations for 
minor crimes such as petty theft, drug use of incorrect Islamic dress, with several methods of 
execution used on those more serious crimes in the Islamic Territories such as murder, adultery, 
banditry and espionage (Harnisch 2010a, 17-18).  
Al Shabaab’s Leadership 
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The executive of al Shabaab, known as the Shura Council, reportedly consists of 85 
members headed by an „Emir‟, although it is not clear as to how much power resides in this 
position (Shinn 2011, 209; Weinstein 2011). This council has the authority to overrule decisions 
made by individual administrations and is responsible for directing al Shabaab‟s policies via 
„offices‟ established to coordinate those policies that concern the entire organisation (Harnisch 
2010a, 15-16). For example, one of the most externally visual of these offices, the Office for 
Supervising Foreign Agencies, recently reversed the decision by a few administrations to expand 
the number of aid agencies allowed into the Islamic Provinces to assist with the drought (Cothia 
2011). Although individual militia forces are controlled by local al Shabaab commanders, the 
council appears to be in command of the overall strategy, organising offensives and managing al 
Shabaab‟s growing networks (MGSE 2011, 18-19).  
While al Shabaab‟s opaque nature makes it difficult to determine who comprises the 
leadership, several key commanders and their basic duties are generally known. Ahmed Godane, 
as the Emir for two and a half years until his recent downfall, remains one of the most prominent 
and influential figures within the movement, although it is uncertain exactly what position he 
currently holds (Chothia 2011; Shinn 2011, 206-207). Before becoming the current Emir at the 
end of 2010, Ibrahim al Afghani controlled the northern branch of al Shabaab that operated 
within Puntland and Somaliland (Harnisch 2010, 4; Shinn 2009, 2). It is not yet publicly known 
who has replaced him in this post. Muktar Robow was initially al Shabaab‟s chief spokesman, a 
position  now  held  by  Ali  Mohamed  Rage,  but  now  appears  to  have  become  one  of  the 
organisation‟s key commanders and is known to control operations in both the Bay and Bakool 
regions (Dagne 2010, 5-6; Shinn 2009, 2). Another prominent leader, Faud Shongole, is known 
to command militia in and around the key port of Marka (Shinn 2009, 2; Weinstein 2011). 
Although there has been no confirmation of their roles, it appears that Hassan Aweys and Hassan 
al  Turki,  the  commander  of  the  Ras  Komboni  Brigade,  have  maintained  command  of  their 
militia after being absorbed into al Shabaab and are viewed as „elder statesmen‟ within the 
movement (Dagne 2010, 6-7; Chothia 2011). Several foreigners are also known to hold positions 
of influence within the executive, though their roles will be discussed later.    
Though the leadership of al Shabaab is undoubtedly dedicated to the Islamist cause, it 
has nonetheless become deeply divided into two opposing factions that differ in the direction al 
Shabaab  should  take.  The  first  faction  comprises  of  the  „transnationalists‟  who  emphasize 
doctrinal purity and contributing to spreading the ideology. As alluded to above, Godane is a key 
figure  in  this  faction,  actively  expanding  al  Shabaab‟s  engagement  with  the  global 
fundamentalist  movement  during  his  time  as  Emir  (Weinstein  2011).  The  second  faction 11 
 
comprises of the „nationalists‟ who, though no less dedicated to the global movement, wish to 
adapt the doctrine to the local circumstances and focus on creating an Islamic state in Somalia 
first. A key figure in this faction is Robow who has publicly argued against al Shabaab imposing 
a strict version of sharia out of line with Somali custom that alienates locals (Bruton 2010, 12-
13; Weinstein 2011). During 2010, these factions engaged in a barely hidden disagreement that 
came to a head in September when Robow withdrew his militia from Mogadishu and returned to 
his base in the Bay region in protest over Godane‟s policies (Dagne 2010, 7; Weinstein 2011). 
Factional disagreements appear to have continued in 2011, with heated words exchanged over 
the barring of aid agencies from famine stricken areas, governed mainly by nationalist faction 
commanders,  and  the  death  of  Fazul  Abdullah  Mohommed,  a  key  ally  of  Godane  who  he 
believes was tricked into going through a government checkpoint (Chothia 2011). 
Al Shabaab’s Capacity  
Estimates  of  al  Shabaab‟s  armed  strength  ranges  between  3000  and  7000  fighters, 
including the approximately  1000 strong foreign contingent, although it is believed that the 
group can mobilise further troops and call on its regional affiliates should it need assistance 
(Shinn 2011, 209-210). A typical al Shabaab fighter is frequently described as a poorly educated 
local youth in his late teens or early twenties uniformed in plain, often dark, clothing and the red 
scarf which is drawn across their face when in action that has given them the local nickname of 
„the masked men‟ (McGregor 2008, 259; Shinn 2011, 208). It remains uncertain as to how many 
of these rank and file members actively believe in the organisation‟s radical ideology. Some 
writers have  claimed  that al  Shabaab has attracted more  thugs  and  opportunists than actual 
fanatics, with most militiamen are reportedly being forcibly conscripted (Bruton 2009, 87-88; Le 
Sage 2010, 2). Others consider that at least the majority hold an inflexible view of Islam that, if 
not already possessed, is indoctrinated into them upon recruitment (Gartenstein-Ross 2009, 31; 
McGregor 2008, 259).  
There is growing evidence of al Shabaab extending its networks beyond the Islamic 
Provinces to act as a mentor and platform for affiliate groups in northern Somalia and elsewhere 
in the region. In a recent report, the United Nation‟s Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea 
(MGSE) found that al Shabaab had established a network of agents to contact and assist Islamist 
militias in the north of Somalia (2011, 19). The most prominent of these is the Islamist militia of 
Mohamed Saiid Atom, though the MGSE considers it effectively became absorbed as a division 
of al Shabaab by late 2010 (2011, 23). Al Shabaab‟s regional networks will be discussed in 
detail in the next chapter. Al Shabaab also appears to have attracted many businesses, which 
prefer  to  operate  under  the  relative  stability  that  the  organisation  provides  in  their  Islamic 12 
 
Provinces.  From  most  of  these  businesses  al  Shabaab  simply  collects  taxes,  raising 
approximately $70 to $100 million annually to help fund their administration and war efforts 
(Harnisch 2010a, 15; MGSE 27). However, the organisation has apparently become actively 
involved with coordinating a lucrative trade cycle, estimated worth at least $15 million exporting 
charcoal and importing sugar and contraband destined for neighbouring countries (Chothia 2011; 
MGSE 27-31).  
Al Shabaab’s Ideology 
In  a  2009  interview  with al Jazeera,  Robow  declared  that  al  Shabaab  stood  for  the 
“implementation of sharia completely, every single element of it” and was fighting to prevent 
„misguidance‟, to see a return of the Caliphate and ensure that there would be justice in Somalia 
and beyond (al Jazeera 2009). In doing so, Robow declared that al Shabaab adhered to the 
Jihadi-Salafi  strain  of  Salafi  thought,  or  in  other  words  the  militant  interpretation  of  Sunni 
Islamic  fundamentalism  (Weinstein  2008).  Although  some  98  percent  of  Somalis  are  Sunni 
Muslims (Stevenson 2007, 42), the vast majority of these follow Sufi beliefs such as reverence 
for shrines and relics as well as the belief that Imams and various saints intercede with God for 
common  people.  In  contrast,  Salafism  rejects these objects  of  Sufi  veneration  as  a  form  of 
polytheism that leads people astray and calls for a return to the basics of Islam (al Jazeera 2009; 
Meijer 2009, 4). This interpretation of Islam is relatively new in Somalia, first appearing in the 
1960s when a number of students who returned from Egypt and Saudi Arabia attempted, with 
limited success, to propagate the Salafi thought they had learned abroad (Shinn 2011, 204).  
In  essence,  Salafism
8  revolves around the strict adherence to  tawhid
9.  This  concept 
encapsulates the  belief that  God,  as  the  Supreme  Being,  does  not share characteristics  with 
humans and alone should be worshiped (Meijer 2009, 4; Wiktorowicz 2006, 208). For Salafis, 
this means that humans are obligated to strictly follow the sharia outlined in the Quran and 
Sunna
10 and use the guidance of the Prophets companions
11 if assistance is needed (Wiktorowicz 
2006, 209),  a trait that Robow demonstrated  with his frequent references from verses in the 
Quran (al Jazeera 2009). To use any other forms of guidance, including human reasoning, will 
lead away from „pure Islam‟ and cause a slow return to the brutality and injustice that existed 
before Islam (Meijer 2009, 4-5; Wiktorowicz 2006, 209-210). Though all Salafis seek to rectify 
what they consider centuries of corrupting influences and misinterpretations, there are divisions 
over the methods best used to accomplish this (Menkhaus 2005, 34-35). The majority of Salafis 
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are non-violent advocating either missionary/educational work or incorporating sharia into the 
laws of the state to bring Muslims back to the right path. Jihadi-Salafis differ, believing that a 
jihad
12, usually in the form of radical political activism or an actual revolution, is necessary to 
overturn the current secular regimes and establish Islamic states that would ensure tawhid is 
adhered to (Meijer 2009, 24; Wiktorowicz 2006, 225).  
As most Jihadi-Salafis movements conduct their struggle within predominantly Muslim 
lands, they tend to draw heavily on the concept of  takfir, the act of declaring a Muslim an 
apostate  (Hegghammer  2009,  246-247;  Wiktorowicz  2006,  227).  Traditionally  takfir  was 
considered an extremely serious measure to be declared only in specific circumstances but today 
radicals interpret it much more liberally, applying the term to entire regimes by declaring that the 
persistence in „sinful acts‟ amounts to apostasy and warrants the use of violence to depose them 
(Hegghammer 2009, 247; Wiktorowicz 2006, 233). In the case of al Shabaab, the sinful acts that 
the TFG and other opposing forces are guilty of that strips them of their claim to be Muslim 
include both their governing style and acceptance of assistance from infidel governments such as 
the USA and Ethiopian. As Robow articulated in his interview, the TFG “brought the enemy of 
God into the county...and are part and parcel of its forces, wearing their uniforms and carrying 
their weapons. They have rejected God‟s commandments and are misguided” (al Jazeera 2009).  
Al Shabaab’s Transnational Focus 
 One  of the  most  prominent  versions  of Jihadi-Salafi  thought  contemporarily  is  that 
espoused by al Qaeda. Al Qaeda expands the concept of takfir to include the requirement for 
Muslims to unite and combat the source  of this apostasy, identified as Western „Crusaders‟ 
(Burke 2004, para 3; Farrall 2011, 132). Though al Qaeda‟s priority is to reverse what they 
perceive to be nearly a century of aggressive Western efforts to humiliate Islam, the ultimate 
goal is to re-establish the Caliphate that would spread just Islamic governance throughout the 
umma
13 (Burke 2004, para 7). In effect al Qaeda is, if not leading, then certainly inspiring what 
Mark N Katz (1999) calls a transnational revolutionary wave. This is a phenomenon that occurs 
when an ideology inspires movements in at least two countries that become linked via their 
common explanation for and solution to their society‟s ills (Katz 1999, 11-13). Al Shabaab 
actively  adheres  to  al  Qaeda‟s  transnational  ideology  and  frequently  attempts  to  place  its 
struggle  in  context  of  the  global  Islamist  movement.  One  direct  result  of  this  international 
outlook has been al Shabaab‟s extensive engagement with a number of foreign elements, the 
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majority of whom share the same Jihadi-Salafi ideology, and it is these foreign elements that I 
shall turn my attention to in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 2: The Foreign Elements of Al Shabaab 
One common explanation as to why al Shabaab has been so relatively successful in 
Somalia has been the inability of the TFG to govern, encumbered as it is with corrupt and 
incompetent institutions headed by a bloated parliament of 550 members that spends most of its 
time infighting (Bruton 2009, 86; Le Sage 2010, 1-2). Although the TFG‟s ineffectiveness is 
certainly  a  prominent  factor  in  Shabaab‟s  success,  it  is  by  no  means  the  only  one.  Just  as 
important  in  understanding  the  organisation‟s  accomplishments  is  the  impact  of  the  various 
foreign actors that al Shabaab has engaged. Whilst the TFG‟s weakness has given al Shabaab the 
opportunity,  the  impact that  the  foreign  elements  have  had  has  enhanced the  organisation‟s 
ability to wage its insurgency and control the territory it governs. From here on, I explore the 
role that these foreign elements have had on al Shabaab, introducing in this  chapter the key 
foreign actors and how al Shabaab is engaging with them before examining in the next chapter 
how these actors‟ influence has manifested itself.  
Al Qaeda and the Wider Islamist Movement 
Relations between al Qaeda and al Shabaab 
Al  Qaeda  is  undoubtedly  the  most  important  entity  in  the  global  militant  Salafi 
movement  and  as  such  is  one  of  the  primary  foreign  elements  influencing  al  Shabaab.  Its 
interaction with al Shabaab has primarily been via indirect dialogue, conducted via a series of 
written and filmed statements released by each organisation. Throughout these statements, al 
Shabaab has constantly sought to align itself with al Qaeda mission and place its activities in 
context  of  the  global  jihad  (Harnisch  2010a,  24-25;  Gartenstein-Ross  2009,  28).  The  first 
statement was released in January 2008 entitled “A Message to the Mujahedeen in Particular and 
Muslims  in  General”  articulating  al  Shabaab‟s  position  and  affinity  for  al  Qaeda‟s 
manhaj
14(Harnisch  2010a,  24;  Gartenstein-Ross  2009,  29).  Interestingly,  this  statement  was 
composed by one of al Shabaab‟s foreign contingents, Abu Monsoor al Amriki
15; a Syrian-
American  radical  who  has  since  played  a  significant  role  in  the  organisation‟s  external 
publications (Gartenstein-Ross 2009, 29). 
There  have  since  been several  other statements  of note  released  by  al  Shabaab  that 
demonstrate the organisation‟s desire to receive recognition from al Qaeda. One example is the 
previously mentioned June 2008 video statement by Godane in which he greeted al Qaeda and a 
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number of its affiliates. Godane released another statement in July 2009 that acknowledged 
Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden as the leaders of the global jihad and portrayed Somalia as 
one of the three fronts on which the jihad is fought against „Crusaders‟(Harnisch 2010a, 26; 
Shinn 2011, 207). One other notable example was a video released in September 2009 entitled 
“At  Your  Service,  Oh  Osama”  in  which  al  Shabaab  pledged  allegiance  to  bin  Laden  and 
requested his guidance (Harnisch 2010a, 26-27; Shinn 2011, 207). Al Qaeda‟s leadership for its 
part has largely reciprocated these approaches, notably acknowledging Somalia as a struggle on 
par with Iraq and Afghanistan, sending condolences for Ayro‟s death in mid 2008 and urging 
that nothing short of an Islamic state be established (Harnisch 2010a, 28; Gartenstein-Ross 2009, 
30). Bin Laden himself dedicated one of his five statements in 2009 to the situation in Somalia, 
openly declaring it to be a key front in the war between Islam and the Crusaders (Harnisch 
2010b; Shinn 2011, 208).  
One school of thought claims that al Qaeda currently operates as a network of semi-
autonomous branches, or „franchises‟, that are established when a local organisation surrenders a 
degree of autonomy to al Qaeda‟s leadership in exchange for the resources and legitimacy it can 
bestow (Byman 2010, Farrell 133-134). As al Shabaab clearly adheres to al Qaeda‟s worldview, 
is willing to engage with the network and has publicly declared its allegiance to the central 
leadership, there has been much speculation that it is attempting to become the next franchise 
organisation (Byman 2010, para 6; Harnisch 2010b para 7-9). However, although there is no 
doubt that al Shabaab is internationalising its agenda, the organisation is unlikely to become an 
al Qaeda franchise in the immediate future, reportedly already turning down such an offer made 
in early 2011 (Bennett 2011). Despite the obvious closeness between the two, al Qaeda has made 
no serious attempts to exercise any form of control over al Shabaab and it appears that the two 
consider each other to be partners rather than the latter being a branch of the former (Harnisch 
2010a,  28).  In  essence,  as  strong  ideological  ally  retaining  its  own  identity,  al  Shabaab‟s 
relationship with al Qaeda is more akin to the Taliban of Afghanistan rather than any of the 
franchise organisations. 
Al Shabaab’s interactions with other Islamist movements 
Aside  from  engaging  in  dialogue  with  the  al  Qaeda  leadership,  al  Shabaab  has 
established connections with several al Qaeda affiliate organisations within the region and has 
hosted several of their operatives. One prominent example is al Qaeda in East Africa (AQEA), 
which has described as becoming so closely linked with al Shabaab it is “difficult to tell where 
one ends and the other begins” (Vidino 2010, 223). Al Shabaab was known to have provided 
sanctuary  for  AQEA‟s  three  leading  operatives,  all  now  deceased,  who  were  wanted  in 17 
 
connection with the 1998 USA embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania (al Jazeera 2011; 
Harnisch 2010a, 21). Abu Talha al Sudani appears to have been associated with al Shabaab from 
its beginning, known to have been provided with a safe house by Ayro during 2004, eventually 
being killed in 2007 whilst battling Ethiopian troops (al Jazeera 2011; Harnisch 2010a, 21). 
Saleh Ali Nabhan was provided with shelter by al Shabaab sometime around 2008, assisting 
with training and appearing in a promotional video for the organisation in late 2008 before being 
killed in September 2009 by US Special Forces in southern Somalia (al Jazeera 2011; Harnisch 
2010a, 22). Fazul Abdullah Mohommed, the elusive mastermind of AQEA, often worked closely 
with al Shabaab and was eventually killed at a Mogadishu checkpoint in June 2011 (al Jazeera 
2011; Kahan 2011, para 3). Al Shabaab has reportedly sheltered many other mid to low level 
operatives  of  AQEA  that  have  effectively  been  absorbed  into  the  organisation‟s  foreign 
contingent (Harnisch 2010a, 23). 
Al Shabaab has also established connections with the prominent al Qaeda affiliate al 
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), some sources describing the two organisations as 
having an „active working partnership‟ (Bennett 2011; Kahan 2011, para 4). Al Shabaab and 
AQAP have a history of mutual praise for each others‟ efforts and it is believed that the two 
organisations  have  recently  been  attempting  to  develop  a  deeper  alliance  (Anzalone  2011). 
Although  the  exact  details  are  largely  unknown  publicly,  it  appears  as  though  the  two 
organisations have been seeking to establish a degree of operational cooperation by shearing 
resources and personal (Anzalone 2011; Bennett 2011). In April 2011 the USA captured an al 
Shabaab operative, Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, who was acting as a liaison between the two 
organisations and has been charged, along with other terrorism related offences, with brokering 
weapons deals with AQAP on behalf of al Shabaab (Bennett 2011; Kahan 2011, para 4). AQAP 
is also believed to have acted as a middle man in al Shabaab‟s unofficial contacts with the al 
Qaeda leadership and has also reportedly urged al Shabaab to attack targets outside of Africa 
(Bennett 2011; Kahan 2011, para 4).  
Al Shabaab‟s relationships with other militant Islamist groups beyond al Qaeda affiliates 
are difficult to determine. For example, it is known al Shabaab established the al Qads
16 brigade 
in 2009 to “join with other Muslims to target the Zionist entity” (Harnisch 2010a, 34; Heintz 
2010, 5), although there is little evidence suggesting that it has deployed these fighters beyond 
Somalia. Most evidence of interaction with other militant Islamists comes from Africa where al 
Shabaab is suspected of having “functional linkages with other jihadist groups” (MGSE 2011, 
140). For example, the 2011 Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (MGSE) report detailed 
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the extensive network that has developed between al Shabaab and a Kenyan group called the 
Muslim Youth Centre (MYC). According to the report, the MYC mostly assists al Shabaab by 
recruiting  indigenous  Kenyans  and  providing  them  with  the  basic  training  and  ideological 
indoctrination for al Shabaab‟s foreign contingent, although has recently considered launching a 
jihad of its own within Kenya (MGSE 2011, 141-145). There is evidence of ties with other 
radical  groups  beyond  its  immediate  region  with  a  Nigerian  terrorist  group,  Boko  Haram, 
recently claiming to have members receiving training in Somalia and has since developed tactics 
that are strikingly similar to al Shabaab‟s (Kahan 2011, para 5).  
Al Shabaab’s Foreign Contingent 
The composition of the foreign contingent 
As alluded to above, the foreign contingent plays a prominent role within al Shabaab 
and  several  foreigners  are  known  to  wield  considerable  influence  within  the  organisation. 
Generally speaking, the foreigners in al Shabaab are more resourceful, better educated and more 
highly motivated than the local recruits, ensuring that many become some of al Shabaab‟s most 
valuable assets. With some notable exceptions, foreigners were initially not considered to play a 
major  role  in  the  organisation  with  spokesmen  lamenting  the  lack  of  foreigners  within  the 
organisation‟s ranks in late 2008 (Harnisch 2010a, 29; McGregor 2008, 261). Since then, al 
Shabaab has drawn hundreds of foreign fighters into their ranks that have proven crucial to al 
Shabaab‟s operational success and strengthened their claim to contribute to the global jihad. As 
such an important aspect of the organisation, many foreigners rise to positions of power and 
influence, with reportedly half of the Shura Council comprising of foreigners (Shinn 2011, 209). 
Some  notable  figures include  prominent recruiter  al  Amriki  of  the  USA,  Godane‟s  Yemen-
Somali advisor Abu Suleiman al Banadiri, the financier Sheikh Mohamed Abu Faid of Saudi 
Arabia and the director of training Abu Musa Mombasa of Pakistan (Dagne 2010, 6; Shinn 2011, 
209). 
In essence there are two main social groups that al Shabaab draws foreign recruits from: 
young ethnic Somalis from the diaspora who hold Islamist or nationalist sentiments and those 
non ethnic Somalis that wish to participate in the global jihad (Harnisch 2010a, 29). Recruitment 
within the diaspora has been particularly successful with one recent estimate claiming that al 
Shabaab‟s foreign contingent comprises of approximately 1000 ethnic Somalis and 200 to 300 
others (Shinn 2011, 210). The majority of these recruits come from the Somali communities in 
Kenya and Yemen, but it is estimated that more than 150 have come from the Somali diaspora in 
Western countries (Gartenstein-Ross et al 2009, 8; Shinn 2011, 212). As it is nearly impossible 19 
 
to  receive  accurate  information  on  diaspora  recruitment  in  Africa  and  the  Middle  East,  the 
majority of reporting has focused on al Shabaab‟s efforts to recruit in the Western based Somali 
communities (Shinn 2011, 213). The largest number of al Shabaab‟s diaspora recruits have come 
from Britain, where approximately 100 are suspected to have left, with the USA, Canadian and 
Swedish  diasporas  each  having  about  20  suspected  recruits  as  well  as  lower  numbers  also 
coming from communities in Australia and Denmark (Gartenstein-Ross et al 2009, 8; Vidino et 
al 2010, 225-227).  
Reasons for the diaspora‟s relatively large contribution of recruits can be found in the 
situation of the diaspora itself. The Somali diaspora is one of the largest in the world with 
approximately  two  million,  or  14%,  of  the  Somali  population  living  abroad,  with  most 
apparently wanting to return when Somalia stabilises (Gartenstein-Ross et al 2009, 7; Harnisch 
2010a, 31). In Western countries perticuarly this desire to return has reportedly caused trouble 
with integration which has led to other problems, notably the high unemployment and feelings of 
lost identity and meaning among youths (Gartenstein-Ross et al 2009, 7-8; Pantucci 2009, 3). 
This pool of disaffected youths has provided al Shabaab‟s recruiters with a niche community to 
recruit from by articulating for them a cause to fight for. Initially most of al Shabaab‟s recruits 
were drawn by a nationalist anger at the Ethiopian invasion to fight for the widely viewed 
legitimate resistance. However, increasing numbers have been attracted by the organisation‟s 
Islamist zeal, one captured recruit apparently declaring that he joined “to fight for a legitimate 
Islamic government” (Gartenstein-Ross et al 2009, 8; Pantucci 2009, 5-6). 
Although  the  non  ethnic  Somali  contingent  is  notably  smaller,  it  has  provided  the 
organisation with some of its most committed and valuable operatives with a significant number 
also involved in the mid to high leadership roles. Thanks largely to the efforts of the MYC, the 
largest group represented are Swahili Kenyans, but also present within al Shabaab‟s ranks are 
other Africans, Arabs, Pakistanis, Bengalis and even a few Caucasians (Harnisch 2010a, 31; 
Shinn 2011, 210). These foreign recruits provide al Shabaab with a verity of skills as diverse as 
their  origins.  Many  have  had  combat  experience,  mostly  in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq,  and  so 
contribute to al Shabaab‟s insurgency in a number of positions ranging from field command to 
training to explosive manufacturing (Gartenstein-Ross 2009, 31; Shinn 2011, 211). Others have 
proven to be dedicated soldiers with several even becoming suicide bombers, notably including a 
Kenyan and a Ugandan in the 2010 Kampala attack (Shinn 2011, 211). A few have played roles 
outside of combat, with at least one medical student in Britain working as part of al Shabaab‟s 
medical team and previously mentioned al Amriki who has used his fluency in languages to play 
a prominent role in recruiting and the leadership (Harnisch 2010a, 31-32, Pantucci 2009, 3).  20 
 
Recruiting techniques and networks 
Al Shabaab‟s recruiting methods are extensive, employing several different means and 
targeting many different audiences. One of the most obvious to outside observers has been al 
Shabaab‟s sophisticated use of recruiting media (Gartenstein-Ross et al 2009, 8; Harnisch 2010a, 
29). These largely seek to portray Somalia as exciting and glorious as any other front in the 
global jihad with nearly all narrated in Arabic but including portions spoken in English and with 
English subtitles with clear attempt to reach the Somali diaspora (Harnisch 2010a, 29-30; Vidino 
2010, 225). Al Amriki‟s videos in particular demonstrate a high degree of technical proficiency, 
combining  appealing  graphics  with  hip-hop  style  Islamist  music  called  nasheed  designed to 
appeal to a more Westernised audience not accustomed to the more standard Islamic chants 
(Gartenstein-Ross et al 2009, 8; Pantucci 2009, 3). The other main method al Shabaab uses is to 
have  active  networks  of  recruiters,  though  few  details  are  known  about  how  these  operate 
(Gartenstein-Ross et al 2009, 9; Harnisch 2010a 2010, 31). One such network is suspected to 
operate in the  Nairobi  suburb  of  Eastleigh  (Shinn 2011,  210).  Another  was known  to  have 
previously operated in Minneapolis, where most of the American Somalis were recruited, using  
mosques and engaging with the community to extol the virtues of the conflict in Somalia and 
encouraging youths to join al Shabaab (Gartenstein-Ross et al 2009, 9; Harnisch 2010a 2010, 
31).  
One of the greatest concerns associated with the foreign contingent is their potential to 
return to their countries of origin and attack in al Shabaab‟s name or at the organisation‟s behest. 
This  has  already  eventuated  in  Uganda  where  four  Ugandans,  two  of  whom  had  received 
training in al Shabaab‟s camps, played a key role in conducting the attacks for al Shabaab, with a 
fifth also becoming a suicide bomber (MGSE 2011, 136-137; Shinn 2011, 211). In Australia, a 
group of mostly Somali men were arrested after they sought endorsement from some al Shabaab 
leaders for their plot to launch a suicide attack on Halsworthy Barracks, though this group had 
no prior contact with al Shabaab (Harnisch 2010a, 33; Farrell 2011, 137). However, it appears 
that al Shabaab remains focused in Africa with most threats directed at Uganda, Burundi and 
Kenya which al Shabaab perceives to be their immediate enemies now Ethiopian troops have 
withdrawn (Harnisch 2010a, 33; MGSE 2011, 24). With the precedent of using members of its 
foreign contingent to attack their homeland established by the Ugandan attacks, there are serious 
concerns  that  al  Shabaab  will  follow  through  on  some  of  its  other  threats  potentially  even 
attacking in the West (Harnisch 2010b; MGSE 2011, 24). 
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Other Notable Actors 
Eritrean involvement 
As  a  transnational  revolutionary  group,  al  Shabaab  primarily  engages  with,  and  is 
therefore influenced by, those foreign elements that share the same revolutionary ideology and 
goals as it does. Nonetheless al Shabaab also engages, on the basis of mutual benefit, with a 
diverse  group  of  minor  actors  that  have  little  or  no  ideological  affiliation.  Although  the 
individual impact upon al Shabaab‟s direction or tactics from this host of „others‟ is negligible, 
their various contributions have assisted in its struggle sufficiently enough to warrant a mention. 
One of the most significant of these minor actors is Eritrea, a small state between Ethiopia and 
the  Red  Sea  that  achieved  independence  in  1993.  There  exists  a  long  history  of  animosity 
between  Eritrea  and  Ethiopia,  stemming  mostly  from  the  country‟s  three  decade  long 
secessionist struggle and the 1998-2000 border war that ended in an uneasy ceasefire between 
the two countries (Heintz 2010, 2-3; MGSE 2011, 68). One result of this hostility has been 
Eritrea‟s active involvement in Somalia, where it has been accused of supporting various armed 
groups effectively fighting a proxy war with Ethiopia in order to divide their attention and 
resources (Heintz 2010, 7; MGSE 2011, 85).  
Although officially in a transition period, Eritrea is effectively ruled as a single party 
dictatorship, with the opaque and clandestine nature of the regime ensuring that it is difficult to 
determine the exact extent of its relationship with various regional groups, including al Shabaab 
(MGSE 2011, 69). It is known that Eritrea at least acted as a patron of the ICU (Heintz 2010, 6; 
Menkhaus 2008, 2), with one report claiming that Eritrea provided up to 2000 troops to assist in 
ICU operations (Stevenson 2007, 43). Eritrea also provided much of the ICU leadership with 
asylum after its fall and a base of operations for the ARS (Dagne 2010, 21; Harnisch 2010a, 11). 
In regards to al Shabaab specifically, Eritrea is suspected of supplying the group with small arms 
and medical supplies as well as initially providing military training for some fighters (Heintz 
2010, 6; McGregor 2008, 259). The recent MGSE report also claims that the Eritrean embassy in 
Nairobi has been paying substantial sums to known al Shabaab associates (MGSE 2011, 85-87). 
Both Eritrea and al Shabaab have deigned these accusations, Eritrea only admitting that it has 
„political links‟ to al Shabaab (MGSE 2011, 69). However, Eritrea‟s previous support of ICU 
and ARS members ensures that it is highly probable that Eritrea is assisting al Shabaab‟s efforts 
in some capacity.  
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It also appears that al Shabaab also engages with various criminal elements throughout 
the region. Although, again, the clandestine nature of these relationships makes the extent of 
criminal involvement with al Shabaab unclear, it seems the traditionally anti-criminal al Shabaab 
has established a mutually beneficial „pax commerciale‟ with a number of criminal networks 
(MGSE 2011, 31). There are at least two Kenyan smuggling operations that al Shabaab is chiefly 
involved with: the people smuggling network of Abdirahman Abdi Salawat and a less clear, 
unnamed network that assists with moving goods across the Kenyan border. Salawat is suspected 
to  be  the  „facilitator  of  choice‟  for  many  Somalis  since  2004,  known  for  arranging  false 
passports for Somalis wishing to enter Europe as well as for smuggling people into Somalia to 
fight for al Shabaab (MSGE 2011, 25-27). Though an associate of Salawat denies the network 
deals with al Shabaab, there are allegations that Salawat has a number of hotels in Nairobi that 
he has used as safe houses to accommodate injured al Shabaab fighters that have been brought 
into Kenya to recuperate (MSGE 2011, 26).  
The  other  smuggling  network,  perhaps  networks,  primarily  deals  with  moving 
commercial goods and weapons over the Kenya-Somali border. Most of the commercial goods 
come from the previously mentioned trading cycle operated by al Shabaab out of Kismaayo 
where it exports charcoal and import consumable goods. It appears that these goods are then sold 
in Kismaayo at below the Kenyan market price to certain businessmen and then smuggled across 
the border to avoid paying any duties (MGSE 2011, 31). From this arrangement it is believed al 
Shabaab generates millions of dollars monthly that is used to fund its administration or purchase 
weapons from arms dealers in Kenya that in turn are smuggled back over the border (MGSE 
2011, 31). Apart from these two networks, al Shabaab is known to deal with several minor 
criminal organisations within Somalia. One example is the organisations extensive dealings with 
black  marketers,  including  purchasing  weapons  from  corrupt  TFG  and  AMISOM  officials 
(Bruton  2010,  14).  Pirate  activity  appears  to  be  tolerated  in  certain  parts  of  al  Shabaab‟s 
territory, notably in the central port town of Xarardheere where the local al Shabaab leader 
released some  captured local pirate chiefs after they agreed to pay a levy on their ransoms 
(MGSE  2011,  38-39).  However,  these  arrangements  seem  to  be  strictly  local  rather  than 
representing a greater relationship between al Shabaab and pirate gangs.  
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Chapter 3: The Impact of the Foreign Elements 
The threat posed by al Shabaab has changed considerably in the four and a half years of 
its insurgency. Evolving from a localised Islamist insurgency relying on hit-and-run attacks, al 
Shabaab is now a widespread movement capable of seizing and holding territory from its rivals 
as well as effectively acting beyond the areas under its immediate influence. It has been al 
Shabaab‟s extensive engagement with the various foreign elements that has been the crucial 
factor in transforming it into Somalia‟s most effective radical Islamist group in recent times. 
Whether  by  inspiring  the  leadership,  improving  the  proficiency  of  al  Shabaab‟s  fighters  or 
simply providing the organisation with resources, foreign elements have had an extensive impact 
upon al Shabaab‟s strategic and tactical behaviour. Although this foreign inspired change has 
been mostly beneficial for al Shabaab, there have been some damaging side effects that could 
potentially  undermine  the  entire  organisation.  As  such  in  this  section  I  shall  examine  the 
influence  over  strategy  and  tactics  that  the  various  foreign  elements  have  had  as  well  as 
exploring the negative repercussions that this influence has had on the organisation. 
The Tactical Impacts 
One of the most heavily influenced aspects of al Shabaab has been its combat tactics, 
with  a  clear  distinction  evident  between  those  indigenous  tactics  and  those  that  have  been 
foreign inspired. In essence, the foreign interaction over al Shabaab has manifested militarily in 
two key ways: firstly in the adoption by al Shabaab of several unconventional tactics that were 
either alien or rare in Somalia previously and secondly by improving the quality of al Shabaab‟s 
fighters and general battlefield performance. In a related field, foreign influence has also had a 
notable  impact  in  improving  al  Shabaab‟s  recruiting  techniques.  Initially,  the  main  foreign 
element  to  impact  upon  al  Shabaab  was  the  wider  militant  Islamist  movement,  with  its 
leadership drawing inspiration from the combat in Afghanistan and Iraq to shape their battlefield 
methodology (Curran 2011; Vidino et al 2010, 223). Eventually though al Shabaab‟s foreign 
contingent grew more influential, with veteran combatants transferring the technical knowhow 
and techniques utilised by Islamists abroad. This information transfer is what effectively enabled 
al  Shabaab  to  move  from  simply  emulating  the  methods  of  other  Islamists  to  conducting 
sophisticated attacks of their own (Gartenstein-Ross 2009, 32; Shinn 2011, 210-211). 
Changing Military Tactics  
Prior to the extensive foreign influence over al Shabaab‟s tactics, the two most common 
insurgent tactics used by the organisation were assassinations and frequent guerrilla assaults 24 
 
upon its enemy‟s positions (Curran 2011, para 6-7; McGregor 2008, 253-254). Assassination is 
one of al Shabaab‟s oldest methods with the group known to have engaged in the well planned 
assassinations of foreign aid workers and TFG supporters throughout Somalia as early as 2003 
(Menkhaus  2005,  42).  The  main  techniques  used  to  kill  the  victim  were  „drive-by‟  style 
shootings or using explosives, most commonly a grenade thrown from a crowd or through a 
window (McGregor 2008, 254). Assaults on the government, Ethiopian and later AMISOM 
forces were primarily conducted by an initial barrage of mortar and rocket fire before gunmen 
engaged with automatic weapons, namely AK-47s (McGregor 2008, 253-254). Al Shabaab has 
also made extensive use of „technicals‟, modified utility trucks that have been armour plated and 
equipped  with  an  anti-aircraft  gun,  providing  mobile  firepower  and  the  closest  thing  to  an 
armour division available to militants in Somalia today (McGregor 2008, 253; MGSE 2011). 
These methods are common in asymmetrical warfare and are still widely used by al Shabaab 
militiamen, albeit with the improved efficiency and the less conventional combat techniques 
gained from the training provided by the foreign contingent. 
The two primary unconventional combat tactics that have been introduced to al Shabaab 
repertoire are the use of suicide bombings and improvised explosive devises (IEDs). Suicide 
bombings were unknown within Somalia before late 2006 when al Shabaab first utilised the 
tactic to attack a government convoy (Harnisch 2010a, 50; Shinn 2011, 208). Although suicide is 
traditionally considered a disgraceful act and taboo in Somali culture, these „martyr operations‟ 
have become an increasingly common tactic of al Shabaab. Al Shabaab‟s suicide attacks have 
also  become  increasingly  sophisticated  over  the  years,  with  the  organisation  mastering  the 
technique of simultaneous attacks and infiltrating bombers past security (Gartenstein-Ross 2009, 
31;  Harnisch  2010a,  35-36).  Al  Shabaab‟s  foreign  contingent  plays  a  large  role  both  in 
organising  and  conducting  the  organisation‟s  suicide  bombings.  Notable  operatives  include: 
Mohamoud Mujajir of Sudan who is in charge of recruiting suicide bombers, a British-Somali 
bomber  whose  attack  in  October  2007  made  him  the  first  known  foreigner  to  attack  in  al 
Shabaab‟s  name,  Shirwa  Ahmed  who  became  America‟s  first  known  suicide  bomber  in 
September 2009 and a Danish-Somali who in December 2009 infiltrated a graduation ceremony 
in Mogadishu and killed 24 people including three government ministers (Shinn 2011; 209-211). 
Interestingly,  Arabic  and  English  have  replaced  Somali  as  the  language  of  choice  in  the 
martyrdom  videos  al  Shabaab  releases,  likely  demonstrating  both  the  origin  and  intended 
audience of most of these martyrs (Vidino et al 2010, 223).  
IEDs, also known as roadside bombs, were not unheard of but uncommon in Somalia 
prior to al Shabaab‟s insurgency.  Initially considered negligible during the early insurgency 25 
 
against Ethiopia (McGregor 2008, 254), IEDs are now one of the main weapons in al Shabaab‟s 
arsenal with the 2011 United Nation‟s Monitoring Group‟s report recording 137 IED incidents 
throughout Somalia between 2010 and 2011 (MGSE 2011, 45). The majority of these IEDs use 
explosives extracted from high explosive artillery shells, occasionally stuffed with material to 
act as shrapnel, and commonly utilise the Bodyguard motorcycle alarm activated by mobile 
phones as a remote control triggering system. (MGSE 2011, 45-46). Although al Shabaab‟s 
IEDs have been described as “relatively low-tech in comparison to other combat arenas”, they 
still require greater technical expertise than is commonly found in largely uneducated Somali 
population (MGSE 2011, 45). As such, al Shabaab‟s extensive use of explosives, both for IEDs 
and suicide attacks, are a clear reflection of impact that foreign expertise and training has had 
upon the organisation (Harnisch 2010a, 35; Shinn 2011, 210).  
Training Camps 
The heavy involvement of foreigners within al Shabaab, apart from the transfer of their 
bomb-making  methods  to  al  Shabaab  operatives,  has  significantly  contributed  to  the 
organisation‟s  increased  battlefield  performance  both  by  providing  extensive  training  and 
participating in combat themselves. Early in their insurgency, al Shabaab‟s militiamen were 
considered  willing  but  largely  incompetent,  often  launching  uncoordinated  attacks  and 
demonstrating poor marksmanship, most notably with the mortars with several cases reported of 
insurgent‟s shell inadvertently landing in civilian areas (McGregor 2008, 256). Since then, al 
Shabaab‟s  forces  have  become  increasingly  competent  owing  largely  to  a  series  of  camps 
operated by veterans of other conflicts that were established throughout southern Somalia to 
train the influx of foreign as well as the local recruits (Gartenstein-Ross 2009, 30-31; Harnisch 
2010a, 20).  
Graduates of these camps receive not only indoctrination into al Shabaab‟s cause but 
also basic military training. Al Shabaab promotional videos frequently show uniformed militants 
engaged in the combat courses, military drill and weapons familiarity exercises necessary to 
instil a combatant with the required discipline and technical knowledge to fight (Gartenstein-
Ross 2009, 31; Harnisch 2010a, 29-30). The results of this foreign conducted training have been 
palpable.  Al  Shabaab‟s  tactical  planning  has  notably  increased  in  sophistication,  with  the 
organisation proving it can now conduct coordinated strikes on high profile targets, including 
both people and buildings, and engage for extended campaigns (Curran 2011, para 8-9; Harnisch 
2010a,  35).  Marksmanship  has  also  noticeably  improved  indicating  an  increased  time  spent 
training combatants, with the MGSE reporting a marked increase of al Shabaab sniper activity 
deployed to harass AMISOM and TFG forces (MGSE 2011, 19).  26 
 
Improving Recruiting 
As previously mentioned, al Shabaab has long desired to attract foreigners to join it and 
has pursued several different methods from recorded statements to community networking to 
recruit them. Several members in al Shabaab‟s foreign contingent have been willing to help the 
organisation attract more recruits and have actually been instrumental in shaping al Shabaab‟s 
productions to become more appealing to the target youth. Most of al Shabaab‟s early work took 
the  form  of  statements,  mostly  authored  by  the  organisations  leadership,  often  using  fiery 
rhetoric to align the organisation with al Qaeda (Harnisch 2010, 25-26; Shinn 2011, 207). This 
tactic seemed to appeal more to those already involved in the global jihad than Islamist inspired 
youths,  notably  attracting  a  number  of  militants  from  the  Afghanistan-Pakistan  border 
(Gartenstein-Ross  2009,  31).  These  veteran  combatants  have  been  particularly  useful  to  al 
Shabaab, especially in passing on their expertise as mentioned above. However, the involvement 
of a younger generation of disciplined fighters was still needed to provide the quality manpower 
for operations.  
By  2009,  al  Shabaab‟s  recruiting  videos  had  become  noticeably  more  advanced, 
displaying battle scenes and militants training as well as noticeably featuring foreigners fighting 
or narrating in Arabic and English (Harnisch 2010, 30). The aforementioned al Amriki has been 
particularly  prominent  in  many  of  these  videos,  especially  the  March  2009  “Ambush  at 
Bardale”,  although  there  have  been  several  other  foreigners  shown  throughout  the  films, 
occasionally in leadership roles (Harnisch 2010, 30). Another example of foreign assistance to 
recruiting occurred when a group of previous recruits appeared on social networks exhorting 
their „homies‟ to join them in the fight, a move that apparently saw a distinguishable wave of 
recruits (Pantucci 2009, 3). Apart from the creative use of recruiting media, the impact of these 
foreigners  in  al  Shabaab‟s  recruitment  effort  has  manifested  in  two  other  significant  ways. 
Firstly, multilingual foreigners provide al Shabaab with an effective way to reach otherwise hard 
to  recruit  populations.  Secondly,  the  prominence  of  non-Somali  foreigners  like  al  Amriki 
demonstrate that al Shabaab‟s claim to be part of a global movement is not just rhetoric and that 
non-local recruits can be assured that they could gain status within the organisation through their 
ability and dedication (Harnisch 2010 30; Vidino 2010, 228-229).  
The Strategic Impacts 
Strategically, the foreign element‟s influence over al Shabaab has manifested itself in 
two main ways. Firstly, foreign elements are primarily responsible for the establishing of al 
Shabaab‟s  ideological  orientation  as  al  Shabaab‟s  dedication  to  the  transnational  militant 27 
 
movement is a new phenomenon in Somalia (Gartenstein-Ross 2009, 25; Vidino et al 2010, 
221). Secondly, the significant interaction with various foreign elements, whether this has been 
through the provision or sharing of resources or by providing al Shabaab with the experience 
necessary to establish its own networks, has undoubtedly strengthened al Shabaab‟s position in 
Somalia and has greatly assisted in the organisation‟s military and economic dominance within 
the  country  (MGSE  2011,  17).  The  wider  militant  Islamist  movement  has  been  the  most 
influential of all the foreign elements strategically speaking, with the global jihad providing the 
ideology and the majority of the organisations that al Shabaab is networked with. Nonetheless, 
the foreign contingent and the verity of other actors have also had notable impacts upon al 
Shabaab‟s strategy. 
Ideological Orientation 
One of the most significant impacts foreign elements have had upon al Shabaab stems 
from al Qaeda‟s radicalisation of al Shabaab‟s core leadership during the 1990s which is directly 
responsible  for  instilling  the  movement‟s  transnational  Islamist  ideology  (Shinn  2009,  2). 
Whereas the previous Islamist groups AIAI, the ICU and Hizbul Islam were primarily nationalist 
in focus, seeking to establish an Islamic state in ethnic Somali lands, al Shabaab has explicitly 
committed itself to the global jihadist ideology of al Qaeda (Gartenstein-Ross 2009, 25; Vidino 
et al 2010, 221). As such, al Shabaab frequently characterises itself as a major actor in the larger 
struggle between Islam and infidelity, linking its local struggle against Ethiopian and AMISOM 
forces  with  the  global  war  against the  „far  enemy‟  of  America  (Gartenstein-Ross  2009,  25; 
Vidino  et  al  2010,  221).  In  al  Shabaab‟s  own  words,  the  current  combat  within  Somalia 
originated  when  “the  world‟s  Crusader  forces  were  mobilised  and  America  unleashed  their 
hunting dogs” to counter the success of Islamists within the country (Pantucci 2010, 2).  
The influence of Islamist foreign elements over al Shabaab‟s ideological orientation has 
continued beyond their original radicalisation of key members. Of particular note have been the 
actions of the foreign contingent, whose significant influence within the Shura Council and their 
natural affiliation with the more radical transnational faction has ensured that al Shabaab has 
maintained a strong adherence to the international Jihadi-Salafi movement (Shinn 2011, 209; 
Weinstein 2011). This influence most visually manifested itself in December 2010 when the 
foreign contingent effectively assumed the role kingmakers, supporting moves to unseat Godane 
and using their influence to ensure his replacement was al Afghani, who is also a dedicated 
transnationalist, albeit more tactful (Weinstein 2011, para 10-12). In a less direct manner, other 
Islamist  groups  frequently  praise  al  Shabaab‟s  ideological  commitment  and  encourage  the 
organisation to continue its efforts to support the transnational Islamist movement (Anzalone 28 
 
2011; Harnisch 2010a, 27-28). Al Shabaab appears eager to earn this praise and it is suspected 
that al Shabaab‟s terrorist attack on the Ugandan capital was at least partly an attempt to impress 
the wider Islamist movement (Harnisch, 2010b).  
The  most  notable  strategic  benefit  al  Shabaab  derives  from  this  heavily  foreign 
influenced ideology is the focus necessary for its high degree of organisation. By having the 
clear vision of Somalia as Islamic Emirate within a wider Caliphate, al Shabaab‟s leadership is 
able to effectively identify those steps to be taken in order to achieve its goal and devise the 
means to pursue them. Amongst the notable stratagems inspired by al Shabaab‟s ideology are its 
authoritarian but universally applied governing style as well as its establishing mixed clan militia 
and administrations in an effort to transcend clan politics and prove the organisation is truly 
basing  its  regime  on  Islam  (Bruton  2010  12;  Weinstein  2008,  para  9-10).  This  degree  of 
organisation stands al Shabaab in stark contrast with the majority of other local organisations, 
especially the TFG, who only have a vague idea of their objectives at best (Bruton 2009, 86; 
Shinn  2011,  207).  Though  ideology  has  played  a  prominent  role  in  al  Shabaab‟s  strategic 
thinking, its role should not be overemphasised. Al Shabaab has long displayed the ability to mix 
pragmatism with ideology in its decision making as recently evidenced by al Shabaab resisting 
calls from the wider movement for it to directly attack Western countries and adopt the al Qaeda 
name (Bennett 2011, Kahan 2011, para 4).  
Cementing al Shabaab’s position within Somalia 
In a  more direct manner, several foreign elements have had an instrumental role in 
consolidating al Shabaab‟s strategic position that has allowed it to expand throughout Somalia 
and beyond. The two primary methods in which foreign elements have assisted in this regard 
have been to provide military assistance and the economic means to raise its necessary revenue. 
Although it is unclear exactly the extent and even when this support began, al Shabaab‟s control 
over much of the key infrastructure such as ports and airstrips throughout the south since 2009 
has ensured that the organisation at least has the potential to receive large amounts of cargo for 
several years (MGSE 2011, 47). While virtually all of the foreign elements that al Shabaab 
engages have been involved in deepening its hold upon its territories, the key contributors to this 
state of affairs have been the host of minor parties that have been clandestinely engaging with al 
Shabaab for mutual benefit. 
The primary method of military assistance has been the supply of weapons and other 
combat  essential  supplies,  such  as  medicine  and  fuel,  used  by  al  Shabaab  for  training  and 
furthering its war efforts. Arms trafficked to al Shabaab appear to come from numerous sources 29 
 
with Eritrea suspected to be a prime supplier, though more ideologically motivated contacts 
throughout Arabia are also believed to be contributing weapons (Heintz 2010, 6; MGSE 2011, 
41). Though it is impossible to assess the quantity it appears the majority of weapons are brought 
into al Shabaab‟s territories via the sea, with other notable methods of delivery include having 
the supplies directly flown in from Eritrea and Arabian countries or smuggled over the Kenyan 
border (Heintz 2010, 6; MGSE 2011, 41, 48-49). In terms of economy, al Shabaab‟s control over 
several key southern ports such as Kismaayo and Marka ensures that the organisation resides 
over lucrative trade routes operated by a mixture of foreign traders who are either ideological 
affiliates  of  al  Shabaab  or  purely  opportunistic  criminal  entities  (MGSE  2011,  29-30).  The 
revenue that al Shabaab gains from these trade routes appears to contribute a significant part to 
the organisation‟s budget which is then used to acquire the necessary weapons as well as pay for 
the various local administration costs and its combatant‟s salaries (MGSE 2011, 27). 
These foreign supplies of weapons and finances, by augmenting those already available 
to  al  Shabaab  within  Somalia,  have  provided  the  organisation  with  the  physical  and  fiscal 
resources required to ensure the organisation‟s dominance over southern Somalia. Being able to 
arm all of its militiamen and purchase the loyalty of those more pragmatically minded Somalis, 
al Shabaab has, until very recently, been relatively untroubled by internal challenges, enabling 
the  organisation  to  expand  its  operations.  This  strength  has  notably  manifested  itself  in  al 
Shabaab‟s  military  prowess,  evidenced  by  its  ability  to  fend  off  many  incursions  into  its 
territory, containing the TFG and AMISOM forces within Mogadishu and actively remaining on 
the offensive against its other opponents throughout the rest of the country (Harnisch 2010a, 18). 
Another key sign of al Shabaab‟s strong strategic position has been its ability to actively network 
with affiliate organisations. Some notable examples include assisting Mohammad Said Atom‟s 
Islamist militia in Puntland by providing them with combat supplies as well as logistical support 
(MGSE 2011, 19-23) and the relationship al Shabaab has fostered with AQAP, having sent at 
least one operative to liaise with it and reportedly sharing resources (Anzalone 2011; Bennett 
2011).  
The Negative Repercussions of Foreign Influence 
In effect, there have been two primary negative side effects from al Shabaab‟s extensive 
engagement with foreign elements: the alienation of several groups within Somali society and 
the attraction of hostile attention from foreign powers. Although al Shabaab initially enjoyed 
reasonably high popular support owing to its leading role in the anti-Ethiopian insurgency, it was 
hoped that with the Ethiopian withdrawal popular opinion would turn against the organisation 
(Menkhaus 2009, 9; Shinn 2009, 4). To some extent this has happened, with some notable 30 
 
defections to the TFG as well as several armed challengers to al Shabaab‟s authority arising, the 
most prominent being the militant Sufi movement Ahlu Sunna wal Jama (ASWJ) (Harnisch 
2010a, 18; Hassan 2009, 5). Al Shabaab‟s association with the wider militant Islamist movement 
and the active recruitment from outside of Somalia has also drawn the attention of the United 
States, amongst others, which in response, not only assisted the TFG but also conducted strikes 
against the organisation (Vidino et al 2010, 223). Although these efforts appear to have done 
little to curtail al Shabaab‟s overall effectiveness, they have likely prevented al Shabaab from 
completely overrunning the entire southern Somalia and certainly caused notable casualties in 
the leadership.  
The Alienation of Somalis 
Although it is impossible to accurately gauge the level of support al Shabaab holds 
within its territories, there is ample evidence to suggest it is not high. In general, Somalis have 
long been known for their displeasure at overt foreign involvement in their country‟s politics. As 
such it is believed that the strong foreign aspects of al Shabaab have been met with disapproval 
in the local communities and has eroded its previous popularity (Dagne 2010, 7; Shinn 2011, 
214).  Al Shabaab‟s heavy regulation of aid agencies, promotion of non-local leaders, especially 
from the northern situated Issaq clan, and several ideologically inspired attacks on prominent 
Sufi shrines and preachers are widely viewed in Somalia as evidence of unwelcome foreign 
influence (al Jazeera 2009; Le Sage 2010, 3-4). In addition to its foreign taint, al Shabaab‟s often 
draconian administrations have prompted several local communities to either rebel or support 
opponents  of  the  organisation  (Harnisch  2010a,  18).  For  example,  several  central  Somali 
communities declared that, though they were appreciative of the order al Shabaab brought, its 
oppressive  laws  and  execution  of  dissenting  elders  had  prompted  them  to  side  with  ASWJ 
(Hassan 2009, 7). 
This alienation and unpopularity has resulted in significant setbacks for al Shabaab, 
often identified as the direct cause of several prominent militants defecting and many notable 
incidences  of  popular  resistance  to  the  organisation.  For  example,  the  senior  Shabaab 
commander Ali Hassan Gheddi, who defected to the TFG with 550 of his militiamen in 2009, 
declared that his reason for doing so was his opposition to the organisation‟s growing foreign 
agenda and vetoing humanitarian aid groups (Dagne 2010, 7; Harnisch 2010a, 15-16). Examples 
of  popular  resistance  to  al  Shabaab  include  the  large  December  2009  protests  throughout 
Mogadishu  that  saw  al  Shabaab‟s  insignia  publicly  burnt  in  response  to  the  organisation‟s 
bombing  of  a  graduation ceremony  that  was  attributed to „foreigners‟  within the  movement 
(Bruton 2010, 13; Harnisch 2010a, 18). On a grander scale, there have been several pockets of 31 
 
armed resistance to al Shabaab‟s rule throughout southern Somalia. Many of these are affiliated 
with  ASJW,  currently  the  most  prominent  resistance  group  to  al  Shabaab  which  operates 
effectively  as  an  umbrella  organisation  of  loosely  allied  militias  united  by  anti-al  Shabaab 
sentiments and adherence to Sufi Islam (Bruton 2010, 11; MGSE 2011, 11). Militarily speaking, 
though ASWJ militia are of inferior quality to al Shabaab‟s forces, they are apparently superior 
in number and can rely on Ethiopian support, which has allowed them to capture the central 
towns of Guraceel and Dusa Mareb from al Shabaab (Hussan 2009, 5-6).  
Reactions of Foreign Enemies 
Al  Shabaab‟s  active  association  with  the  wider  militant  Islamist  movement  and 
extensive foreign recruiting has drawn the attention of the USA and, to a lesser extent, European 
policy makers. In early 2008, citing al Shabaab‟s ties to al Qaeda and leadership‟s experience in 
Afghanistan, the US government designated al Shabaab as a terrorist organisation (Dagne 2010, 
5; Vidino et al 2010, 223). Although in an interview Robow initially claimed the designation 
was an honour showing that the organisation was on the right path (al Jazeera 2009; Gartenstine-
Ross 2009, 29), actions since taken by the USA and European Union (EU) have frequently 
frustrated al Shabaab‟s operations. Both the USA and EU are known to provide equipment, 
logistical support and training to the TFG. For example, the EU has successfully trained 600 
Somali  troops  in  Uganda  and  intends  to  train  at  least  another  1400  to  assist  the  TFG  and 
AMISOM forces (Harnisch 2010b, para 10). How effective these efforts have been is debatable 
for, even after four and half years, the TFG is rarely able to project authority beyond Mogadishu 
and it is predicted between a third and a half of the provided supplies ends up in the black 
market, often to be bought by al Shabaab itself (Bruton 2010, 14; MGSE 2011, 44). 
The  USA  has  also  conducted  several  military  strikes  against  al  Shabaab,  usually 
targeting the organisation‟s key operatives. High ranking casualties of note include Ayro, al 
Shabaab‟s founder and first Emir, who was killed by a US missile strike in his central Somali 
home during May 2008 (Harnisch 2010a, 12; Shinn 2009, 2) and AQEA member Nabhan who 
was killed when US Special Forces attacked his convoy in southern Somalia during September 
2009 (al Jazeera 2011; Vidino et al 2011, 223-224). Several mid-ranking members have also 
been  targeted  by  the  US  in  efforts  to  disrupt  al  Shabaab‟s  activities.  Two  recent  examples 
include  a  missile  strike  in  June  2011  on  an  al  Shabaab  position  outside  of  Kismaayo  that 
reportedly killed two al Shabaab operatives planning attacks outside of the country as well as 
AQAP liaison Warsame who was captured in northern Somalia during April 2011 (Kahan 2011, 
para  4).  Ethiopia  is  known  to  engage  in  operations  against  al  Shabaab,  notably  providing 
extensive assistance for ASWJ forces and conducting several incursions of varying success into 32 
 
al  Shabaab‟s  territories  (MGSE  2011,  51-52).  One  important  point  of  difference  between 
Ethiopia  and  the  USA  is  that  the  former  is  more  concerned  with  al  Shabaab‟s  possible 
engagement with Eritrea and various Ethiopian separatist movements than the organisation‟s 
involvement with other Islamists.  
The Overall Effectiveness of Foreign Elements Involvement 
Although there have clearly been some serious negative repercussions, by augmenting 
local force‟s capabilities the various foreign elements have played a crucial role in al Shabaab 
gaining its current favourable position. By providing enhanced tactical capacities and strategic 
considerations, foreign influence has assisted al Shabaab to develop from a small, motivated 
militia  within  the  ragtag  anti-Ethiopian  insurgency  into  one  of  the  most  effective  militant 
movements in Somalia. Whilst at first glance the adverse side effects of foreign engagement 
could provide an Achilles heel to al Shabaab, on closer inspection they appear to be less fatal 
than hoped. Although the numerous defections and resistance to al Shabaab demonstrates that 
many Somalis do not agree with al Shabaab‟s foreign inspired ideology and methods, many 
other Somalis appear to prefer the relative security its effective, if authoritarian, administration 
provides. In contrast, alternative organisations such as the TFG and ASWJ have never been able 
to solicit much local support and as such are more dependent upon their foreign backers than al 
Shabaab has ever been. The efforts by al Shabaab‟s international opponents, though no doubt 
impeding the organisation, have not had the detrimental impact intended. Overall, al Shabaab‟s 
engagement  with  foreign  elements  has  seen  the  benefits  noticeably  outweigh  the  negative 
impacts.  
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Concluding Remarks 
In  essence,  whether  it  has  been  by  providing  al  Shabaab  with  quality  fighters  and 
trainers,  its  leaders  with  a  vision  for  the  country  or  the  movement‟s  administrations  with 
supplies, the various foreign elements have effectively enabled al Shabaab to outmanoeuvre its 
adversaries  and  establish  a  position  of  dominance  within  Somalia.  By  identifying  the 
instrumental  role  played  by  external  actors  upon  al  Shabaab,  this  analysis  provides  several 
implications for potential policy propositions and avenues for further research. The current focus 
of most policy has been to support and reform the TFG in the so far vain hope of establishing a 
legitimate alternative to al Shabaab. Perhaps it is time for those interested parties to instead shift 
their attention towards methods of counteracting or at least reducing the foreign assistance that 
gives al Shabaab‟s strength, possibly via a blockade of al Shabaab controlled ports or more 
actively combating the regional smuggling networks. Should these not prove feasible, than the 
recognition of the large influence of various foreign elements over al Shabaab at least provides a 
method to understand and predict al Shabaab‟s behaviour and shape policy around that. Also, as 
this dissertation is far from exhaustive, further research  should be conducted  into the lesser 
explored areas such as the movement‟s complex ideology and those non-ideological cartel-like 
elements that al Shabaab engages with in order to gain the full picture of the organisation. 
The recent famine within al Shabaab‟s territories, coupled with several bouts of factional 
infighting  amongst  al  Shabaab‟s  leadership,  has  resulted  in  a  noticeable  weakening  of  the 
organisation, with some observers predicting al Shabaab‟s defeat in the coming months (Chothia 
2011; Gentleman 2011). However, expectations of al Shabaab‟s imminent collapse should not be 
too high as the organisation has proved notably resilient, surviving several predictions‟ of its 
demise previously. Although challenges from the famine and internal resistance has prompted al 
Shabaab to withdraw from several areas at once, including Mogadishu, these areas were largely 
on the periphery of al Shabaab‟s control and several key areas in Southern Somalia, notably 
Kismaayo, Marka and Baidoa, are still firmly under the organisation‟s control.  
Al Shabaab‟s key local opponents the TFG and ASWJ have been largely unable to 
capitalise upon al Shabaab‟s withdrawal with the void being largely filled by former al Shabaab 
allies, warlords and various clan militias who have established amongst them more than 20 self 
declared mini-states (Gentelman 2011). However, even the most successful of these mini-states 
such as Azania or the Shabelle Valley Administration rarely span more than a few villages and 
effectively  act  as  proxies  for  neighbouring  Ethiopia  and  Kenya  who  supply  most  of  their 
weapons and funds. As such, though al Shabaab has suffered several setbacks recently it still 34 
 
remains one of the dominant groups within Somalia. Indeed, al Shabaab is already showing signs 
of  regrouping,  ensuring  that  the  organisation,  with  its  transnational  ideology  and  foreign 
augmented forces, will remain a Somali, regional and international concern for some time to 
come.  
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Annex A: The Map of Somalia 
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Annex B: The Current Political Zones in Somalia 
 
This map was created by the author by adapting an existing map, omitting unnecessary details 
and  simplifying  the  shading.  Original  map  can  be  found  at 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/09/10/world/africa/20110910-somalia-a-country-
broken-into-pieces.html?ref=africa  37 
 
Annex C: Glossary of Relevant Groups, People and Terms (alphabetically by first name) 
Abdirahman Abdi Salawat: a Somali people smuggler operating out of Nairobi who is suspected 
to assisted al Shabaab and their affiliates on numerous occasions. 
Abu Mansour al Amriki: the alias of Omar Hammami, an American-Syrian Islamist who became 
one of the first foreigners to join al Shabaab sometime in late 2006. Primarily involved with the 
organisation‟s leadership and recruiting efforts. 
Abu Suleiman al Banadiri: the Yemeni-Somali adviser to Godane. 
Abu Musa Mombasa: a Pakistani militant who is al Shabaab‟s director of training.  
Abu Talha al Sudani: a prominent AQEA operative who was affiliated with al Shabaab as early 
as 2004. Killed in December 2007 fighting Ethiopian troops in Somalia  
Aden Hashi Ayro: the first leader of al Shabaab from its founding in 2003 until May 2008 when 
he was killed by a US missile strike on his home in central Somalia.  
Ahlu Sunna wal Jama (ASWJ): an umbrella organisation of militant Sufi militia opposed to al 
Shabaab. Although ASWJ is allied with the TFG, it has been branded an Ethiopian proxy owing 
to its heavy reliance on assistance from Ethiopia.  
Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame: a mid-ranking al Shabaab operative who was acting as a liaison 
between the organisation and AQAP before the USA captured him in April 2011. 
Ahmed Abdi Godane: also known as Abu Zabayr. Al Shabaab‟s second leader from Ayro‟s 
death in May 2008 until he was usurped by moves in the Shura council in late December 2010. 
Appears to remain a prominent commander within the organisation 
Al Itihaad al Islamiya (AIAI): the primary Islamist group in Somalia throughout the 1990‟s that 
faded  to  irrelevance  by  the  mid  2000‟s.  Al  Shabaab‟s  founders  split  from  the  group  in 
disagreement with the elder leadership‟s direction in 2003.  
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP): a militant Salafi movement that operates primarily 
in Yemen and is allegedly one of al Qaeda‟s franchise organisations. Believed to have an active 
partnership with al Shabaab, although the exact details as to their relationship are unclear.  
Al Qaeda in East Africa (AQEA): an al Qaeda cell not highly active since the early 2000‟s but 
most widely known for being responsible for the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania 38 
 
during 1998. Many of its members have since found shelter in Somalia and are believed to have 
become a part of al Shabaab. 
Ali Hassan Gheddi: formerly an al Shabaab commander who defected to the TFG with 550 men 
in 2009, citing several al Shabaab‟s policies such as regulating humanitarian aid agencies as his 
motivation for switching sides. 
Ali Mohamed Rage: a commander and currently the chief spokesman for al Shabaab  
Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS): a broad coalition of Somali groups that were 
opposed to the December 2006 Ethiopian invasion that overthrew the ICU. Initially based in 
Eritrea, ARS split in 2008 when moderates joined in the peace negotiations in Djibouti and the 
militants lead by Aweys who returned to Somalia to eventually merge with other local groups to 
form Hizbul Islam 
Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism (ARPC): a USA facilitated alliance 
comprising mostly of local warlords with the intent to reverse the growing power of the ICU. 
Were decisively defeated by the ICU mid 2006  
The African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM): the African Union force mandated by the 
United Nations to protect the TFG and has a current strength of 9000 although an additional 
3000 more soldiers are expected to reinforce them later in 2011. So far only two nations, Uganda 
and Burundi, have contributed troops. 
Azania State: a small self declared state that contests land with al Shabaab along the Kenyan 
border. Effectively a proxy of Kenya from which Azania gains extensive assistance 
Faud Mohamed Khalaf Shangole: one of al Shabaab‟s founders and a prominent commander, 
believed to control the militia around the port of Marka.  
Fazul  Abdullah  Mohommed:  AQEA‟s  mastermind,  known  to  have  worked  closely  with  al 
Shabaab and was a key ally of Godane. Killed June 2011 at a TFG checkpoint in Mogadishu 
Hassan Dahir Aweys: a prominent Somali Islamist who has held a leadership position in nearly 
every prominent Islamist group in Somalia since AIAI. Currently a commander in al Shabaab 
Hassan al Turki: the commander of the Ras Komboni Brigade which defected from Hizbul Islam 
to join al Shabaab in February 2010. Remains a commander for al Shabaab in southern Somalia 
Hizbul Islam: the now disbanded Somali Islamist group led by Aweys that frequently competed 
with al Shabaab for territory and allegiance, although the two were officially allied to combat the 39 
 
TFG. Was absorbed into al Shabaab in December 2010 after suffering a string of defections and 
defeats 
Ibrahim  Haji  Jama  al  Afghani:  one  of  the  founding  members  of  al  Shabaab,  controlling 
operations in Puntland and Somaliland before becoming Emir in late December 2010.  
Islamic  Courts  Union  (ICU):  originally  a  coalition  of  eleven  minor  Islamic  administrations 
around Mogadishu who joined together around mid 2004. Gradually more groups joined the ICU 
and it grew in power and influence effectively controling much of southern and central Somalia. 
Overthrown by the 2006 Ethiopian invasion that placed the TFG in power 
Jihadi-Salafi: the strain of Salafism that al Shabaab adheres to which advocates the need for a 
struggle, or jihad, often in the form of aggressive political activism or revolutions, to establish 
Islamic states that would ensure sharia is correctly implemented.  
Mohamed Abu Faid: a Saudi Arabian militant who is a financier for al Shabaab  
Mohamed Siad Barre: the socialist inspired dictator whose regime was the last authoritative 
government in Somalia. As a General, Said Barre seized power in the 1969 coup and ruled until 
1991 when he was overthrown by warlords. He died in 1995 exiled in Kenya. 
Mohamed  Saiid  Atom:  leader  of  an  Islamist  militia  in  the  north  of  Somalia  that  is  closely 
associated with al Shabaab. Has been known to receive significant assistance the organisation 
and has possibly become a division of al Shabaab. 
Mohamoud Mujajir: a Sudanese militant believed to be in charge of recruiting suicide bombers 
for al Shabaab 
Mukhtar  Ali  Robow:  also  known  as  Abu  Mansuur.  One  of  the  founders,  previous  chief 
spokesman and a prominent commander within al Shabaab, believed to command forces in the 
Bay and Bakool regions.  
Muslim Youth Centre: a Kenyan organisation that reportedly assists al Shabaab by recruiting 
and indoctrinating Kenyans to act as part of the organisation‟s foreign contingent. 
Quran and Sunna: the Muslim holy texts. Muslims believe the Quran was divinely dictated to the 
Prophet Mohammed and is therefore literally the word of God. The Sunna is „the example of the 
Prophet‟ comprising of a collection of sayings, or hadith, attributed to Mohammed himself that 
elaborate on the ambiguous areas in the Quran. 40 
 
Ras  Komboni  Brigade:  an  Islamist  militia  based  in  southern  Somalia  headed  by  al  Turki. 
Comprised  of  approximately  one  quarter  of  Hizbul  Islam‟s  strength  and  the  entire  militia‟s 
defection to al Shabaab in February 2010 marked the beginning of the end for Hizbul Islam. 
Salafism: a revivalist school of Islamic thought that seeks to rectify what adherents consider as 
centuries of corrupting influences and misguidance over Islam by turning to the fundamentals of 
the religion outlined in the Quran and Sunna. The only acceptable additional guidance for Salafis 
comes by the Prophets companions, in Arabic the salaf, who were considered rightly guided 
themselves. All other forms of knowledge, including human reasoning, are considered flawed 
and, if used, will lead to a return of the ignorance and barbarity that Islam saved mankind from. 
Saleh Ali Nabhan: a prominent al Qaeda operative who was hosted by al Shabaab between 2008-
2009, providing assistance with its recruiting and training during his time in Somalia. Killed 
when US Special Forces attacked his convoy in southern Somalia during September 2009 
Shabelle Valley Administration: a small self declared state in southern Somali region of Hiraan. 
Like ASWJ, the Shabelle Valley Administration is effectively a proxy of Ethiopia. 
Sharia: Islamic law prescribed in the Quran and Sunna to justly govern society 
Sharif Sheikh Ahmed: the current head of the TFG. Formerly the moderate leader of the ICU, he 
was gradually becoming sidelined by radicals before the Ethiopian invasion. Led the moderates 
in peace negotiations during 2007-2008 and was elected President of the new TFG in early 2009.  
The Shura Council: al Shabaab‟s executive body, believed to comprise of 85 members.  
Takfir: the process of declaring a Muslim apostate, intended to be a serious undertaking. Jihadi-
Salafis tend to use it more liberally in order to legitimise their struggles. Al Qaeda expanded the 
concept to also include the requirement to attack the source of apostasy. 
Tawhid: the concept that encapsulates the uniqueness and perfection of God that entitles Him 
alone to be worshiped. For Salafis this also means humans are obligated to follow the social 
guidelines and laws outlined in the Quran and Sunna and forms the basis of their reasoning. 
Techniquals:  sometimes  called  battlewagons.  A  modified  utility  truck,  often  armour  plated, 
equipped with an antiaircraft or other heavy machinegun on the back. Commonly used by militia 
throughout Somalia for mobile heavy firepower and even troop transport when needed.  
Transitional  Federal  Government  (TFG):  the  feeble  but  internationally  recognised  Somali 
government. Known to be widely corrupt and incompetent, the TFG institutions and parliament, 41 
 
which is currently about 550 strong, is unable to exert its authority far beyond Mogadishu and 
relies heavily on allied militia and AMISOM forces to survive and combat al Shabaab. 
Umma: the universal Islamic community 
Zakat: Islamic alms or charitable donations. Al Shabaab collects and distributes them as part of 
its taxation and public relations efforts. 
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